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Abstract In [1] we present an extension of Prime Event Structures by a
mechanism to express dynamicity in the causal relation. More precisely
we add the possibility that the occurrence of an event can add or remove
causal dependencies between events and analyse the expressive power of
the resulting Event Structures w.r.t. to some well-known Event Struc-
tures from the literature. This technical report contains some additional
information and the missing proofs of [1].
1 Event Structures for Resolvable Conflict
For a transition based ES with a few additional properties, there is a natural
embedding into RCESs.
Definition 20. Let µ be an ES with a transition relation → defined on con-
figurations such that X → Y implies X ⊆ Y and X ⊆ X ′ ⊆ Y ′ ⊆ Y im-
plies that X→ Y =⇒ X ′→ Y ′ for all configurations X,Y,X ′, Y ′ of µ. Then
rces(µ) = (E, {X ⊢ Z | ∃Y ⊆ E . X→Y ∧ Z ⊆ Y }).
Note that the SESs and GESs satisfy these properties. We show that the resulting
structure rces(µ) is indeed an RCES and that it is transition equivalent to µ.
Lemma 2. Let µ be an ES that satisfies the conditions of Def. 20. Then rces(µ)
is a RCES and rces(µ)≃tµ.
Proof. By Def. 9 in [1], rces(µ) is a RCES.
Assume X→Y . Then, by Def. 20, X ⊆ Y and X ⊢ Z for all Z ⊆ Y .Then,
by Def. 10 in [1], X→rcY .
Assume X→rcY . Then, by Def. 10 in [1], X ⊆ Y and there is some X ′ ⊆ X
such that X ′ ⊢ Y . By Def. 20 for rces(·), then X ′ ⊢ Y ′ for all Y ′ ⊆ Y . So there
is a set Y˜ such that Y ⊆ Y˜ and X ′ ⊢ Y˜ ′ for each Y˜ ′ ⊆ Y˜ . Then, by Def. 20
for rces(·), it follows X ′ → Y˜ ′ and X ′ ⊆ X ⊆ Y ⊆ Y˜ . Finally, by the second
property of Def. 20, X→Y .
⋆ Supported by the DFG Research Training Group SOAMED.
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Figure 1. Counterexamples.
2 Shrinking Causality
In SESs both notions of configurations, traced-based and transition-based, coin-
cide; and in different situations, the more suitable one can be used.
Lemma 3. Let σ be a SES. Then CTr(σ) = C(σ).
Proof. Let σ = (E,#,→,⊲). By Def. 13 in [1], C ∈ CTr(σ) implies that there
is some t = e1 · · · en such that t ⊆ E, ∀1 ≤ i, j ≤ n . ¬ (ei#ej), ∀1 ≤ i ≤
n .
(
ic(ei) \ dc
(
ti−1, ei
))
⊆ ti−1, and C = t. Hence, by Def. 13, ti→s ti+1 for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n and ∅→s {e1}. Thus, by Def. 13, C ∈ C(σ).
By Def. 13, C ∈ C(σ) implies that there are X1, . . . , Xn ⊆ E such that
∅→sX1→s . . .→sXn and Xn = C. Then, by Def. 13, we have:
∅ ⊆ X1 ⊆ X2 ⊆ . . . ⊆ Xn ⊆ E (C1)
∀e, e′ ∈ Xn . ¬ (e#e
′) (C2)
∀e ∈ X1 . (ic(e) \ dc(∅, e)) ⊆ ∅ (C3)
∀1 ≤ i < n . ∀e ∈ Xi+1 \Xi . (ic(e) \ dc(Xi, e)) ⊆ Xi (C4)
Let X1 = {e1,1, . . . , e1,m1} and Xi \ Xi−1 = {ei,1, . . . , ei,mi} for all 1 < i ≤ n.
Then, by Def. 13, t = e1,1 · · · e1,m1 · · · en,1 · · · en,mn = e
′
1 · · · e
′
k is a trace such
that t ⊆ E (because of (C1)), ¬
(
e′i#e
′
j
)
for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k (because of (C1) and
(C2)), for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k and all 1 ≤ j ≤ mi we have
(
ic(ei,j) \ dc
(
ti−1, ei,j
))
⊆
ti−1 (because of (C3) and (C4)), and t = C (becauseXn = C). Thus C ∈ CTr(σ).
Moreover the following technical Lemma relates transitions and the extension
of traces by causally independent events.
Lemma 4. Let σ = (E,#,→,⊲) be a SES and X,Y ∈ C(σ). Then X →s Y
iff there are t1 = e1 · · · en, t2 = e1 · · · enen+1 · · · en+m ∈ T(σ) such that X = t1,
Y = t2, and ∀e, e′ ∈ Y \X . (ic(e) \ dc(X, e)) ⊆ X.
Proof. By Def. 13 in [1] and Lem. 3, X ∈ C(σ) implies that there is a trace
t1 = e1 · · · en ∈ T(σ) such that X = t1.
If X →s Y then, by Def. 13, X ⊆ Y , ∀e, e′ ∈ Y . ¬(e#e′), and ∀e ∈ Y \
X . (ic(e) \ dc(X, e)) ⊆ X . Then, by Def. 13, t2 = e1 · · · enen+1 · · · en+m ∈ T(σ)
and Y = t2 for an arbitrary linearization en+1 · · · en+m of the events in Y \X , i.e.
with {en+1, . . . , en+m} = Y \X such that en+i 6= en+j whenever 1 ≤ i, j,≤ m
and i 6= j.
Dynamic Causality in Event Structures (Technical Report) 3
If there is a trace t2 = e1 · · · enen+1 · · · en+m ∈ T(σ) such that Y = t2 and
∀e, e′ ∈ Y \ X . (ic(e) \ dc(X, e)) ⊆ X then X ⊆ Y . Moreover, by Def. 13,
t2 ∈ T(σ) implies ∀e, e′ ∈ Y . ¬ (e#e′). Thus, by Def. 13, X→sY .
Note that the condition ∀e, e′ ∈ Y \ X . (ic(e) \ dc(X, e)) ⊆ X states that
the events in Y \X are causally independent from each other.
As mentioned above DESs and SESs have the same expressive power. To show
this fact we define mutual encodings and show that they result into structures
with equivalent behaviors. To translate a SES into a DES we create a bundle for
each initial causal dependence and add all its droppers to the the bundle set.
Definition 21. Let σ = (E,#,→,⊲) be a SES. Then des(σ) = (E,#, 7→),
where S 7→y iff S ⊆ E, y ∈ E, and ∃x ∈ E . x→y ∧ S = {x} ∪ [x→ y]⊲.
The above translation from SES into DES shows that for each SES there is
a DES with exactly the same traces and configurations.
Lemma 5. For each SES σ there is a DES δ, namely δ = des(σ), such that
T(σ) = T(δ) and C(σ) = C(δ).
Proof (Proof of Lemma 5). Let σ = (E,#,→,⊲) be a SES. By Defs. 12 and
1 in [1], # ⊆ E2 is irreflexive and symmetric. Hence, by Defs. 7 in [1] and 21,
δ = des(σ) is a DES.
Let t = e1 · · · en. By Def. 13 in [1], t ∈ T(σ) iff t ⊆ E, ¬ (ei#ej), and
(ic(ei) \ dc
(
ti−1, ei
)
) ⊆ ti−1 for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. Since dc(H, e) = {e′ | ∃d ∈
H . [e′→e]⊲ d} and ic(e) = {e′ | e′→e}, we have
(
ic(ei) \ dc
(
ti−1, ei
))
⊆ ti−1
iff ∀e′ ∈ E . e′→ei =⇒ e′ ∈ ti−1 ∨ ∃d ∈ ti−1 . [e′→ei]⊲d for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. By
Def. 21, then t ∈ T(σ) iff t ⊆ E, ¬ (ei#ej), and X 7→ ei =⇒ ti−1 ∩X 6= ∅ for
all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n and all X ⊆ E. Hence, by the definition of traces in § 2.2 in [1],
t ∈ T(σ) iff t ∈ T(δ), i.e. T(σ) = T(δ).
By Lem. 3, § 2.2, and Def. 13, then also C(δ) = CTr(σ) = C(σ).
The most discriminating behavioral semantics of DESs used in literature are
families of posets. Thus the translation should also preserve posets.
Theorem 11. For each SES σ there is a DES δ = des(σ), such that σ≃p δ.
Proof. Let σ = (E,#,→,⊲) be a SES.
By Lem. 5, δ = des(σ) = (E,#, 7→) is a DES such that T(σ) = T(δ) and
C(σ) = C(δ).
Let t = e1 · · · en ∈ T(σ), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and the bundles X1 7→ ei, . . . , Xm 7→ ei
all bundles pointing to ei. For U to be a cause for ei Def. 13 in [1] requires
(ic(ei) \ dc(U, ei)) ⊆ U . Since dc(H, e) = {e′ | ∃d ∈ H . [e′→e]⊲d} and ic(e) =
{e′ | e′→ e}, this condition holds iff the condition e′→ ei =⇒ e′ ∈ U ∨ ∃d ∈
U . [e′→ei]⊲ d holds for all e′ ∈ E. By Def. 21, then (∀1 ≤ k ≤ n . Xk ∩ U 6=
∅) ⇐⇒ ((ic(ei) \ dc(U, ei)) ⊆ U). So, by Defs. 8 and 13 in [1], σ≃p δ.
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In the opposite direction we map each DES into a set of similar SESs such
that each SES in this set has the same behavior as the DES. Therefore for
each bundle Xi 7→ e we choose a fresh event xi as initial cause xi → e, make
it impossible by a self-loop xi → xi, and add all events d of the bundle Xi as
droppers [xi→e]⊲d.
Definition 22. Let δ = (E,#, 7→) be a DES, {Xi}i∈I an enumeration of its
bundles, and {xi}i∈I a set of fresh events, i.e. {xi}i∈I ∩ E = ∅. Then ses(δ) =
(E′,#,→,⊲) with E′ = E ∪ {xi}i∈I , → = {xi→e | Xi 7→e} ∪ {xi→xi | i ∈ I},
and ⊲ = {[xi→e]⊲d | d ∈ Xi ∧Xi 7→e}.
Of course it can be criticized that the translation adds events (although they
are fresh and impossible). But as the following example—with more bundles than
events—shows it is not always possible to translate a DES into a SES without
additional impossible events.
Lemma 6. There are DESs δ = (E,#, 7→), as e.g. δ = ({a, b, c, d, e} , ∅, 7→)
with 7→ = {{x, y} 7→e | x, y ∈ {a, b, c, d} ∧ x 6= y}, that cannot be translated into
a SES σ = (E,#′,→,⊲) such that T(δ) = T(σ).
Proof (Proof of Lemma 6). Assume a SES σ = (E,#,→,⊲) such that E =
{a, b, c, d, e} and T(σ) = T(δ). According to § 2.2 in [1], T(δ) contains all se-
quences of distinct events of E such that e is not the first, second, or third event,
i.e. for e to occur in a trace it has to be preceded by at least three of the other
events. Since by Def. 13 in [1] conflicts cannot be dropped, T(σ) = T(δ) im-
plies # = ∅. Moreover, since e has to be preceded by at least three other events
that can occur in any order, → has to contain at least three initial causes for e.
W.l.o.g. let a→e, b→e, and c→e. Because of the traces abd, acd ∈ T(δ), we need
the droppers [b→e]⊲d and [c→e]⊲d. Then ad ∈ T(σ) but ad /∈ T(δ). In fact if
we fix E = {a, b, c, d, e} there only finitely many different SESs σ = (E,#,→,⊲)
and for none of them T(δ) = T(σ) holds.
Note that the above lemma implies that no translation of the above DES can
result into a SES with the same events such that the DES and its translation
have same configurations or posets. However, because the xi are fresh, there are
no droppers for the self-loops xi→xi in ses(δ). So the translation ensures that
all events in {xi}i∈I remain impossible forever in the resulting SES. In fact we
show again that the DES and its translation have the exactly same traces and
configurations.
Lemma 7. For each DES δ there is a SES σ, namely σ = ses(δ), such that
T(δ) = T(σ) and C(δ) = C(σ).
Proof (Proof of Lemma 7). Let δ = (E,#, 7→) be a DES. By Def. 7 in [1],
# ⊆ E2 is irreflexive and symmetric. Hence, by Defs. 12, 1 in [1], and 22,
σ = ses(δ) = (E′,#,→,⊲) is a SES.
Let t = e1 · · · en. Then, by Def. 13 in [1], t ∈ T(σ) iff t ⊆ E, ¬(ei#ej),
and (ic(ei) \ dc
(
ti−1, ei
)
) ⊆ ti−1 for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. Note that we have t ⊆
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E instead of t ⊆ E′, because all events in t have to be distinct and for all
events in E′ \ E there is an initial self-loop but no dropper. Since dc(H, e) =
{e′ | ∃d ∈ H . [e′→e]⊲d} and ic(e) = {e′ | e′→e}, we have
(
ic(ei) \ dc
(
ti−1, ei
))
⊆ ti−1 iff ∀e
′ ∈ E . e′→ei =⇒ e
′ ∈ ti−1 ∨ ∃d ∈ ti−1 . [e
′→ei]⊲d for all 1 ≤ i ≤
n. By Def. 22, then t ∈ T(σ) iff t ⊆ E, ¬ (ei#ej), and X 7→ei =⇒ ti−1 ∩X 6= ∅
for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n and all X ⊆ E. Hence, by the definition of traces in § 2.2 in
[1], t ∈ T(σ) iff t ∈ T(δ), i.e. T(σ) = T(δ).
By Lem. 3, the definition of configurations in § 2.2, and Def. 13, then also
C(δ) = CTr(σ) = C(σ).
Moreover the DES and its translation have exactly the same posets.
Theorem 12. For each DES δ there is a SES σ = ses(δ), such that δ≃pσ.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 12). Let δ = (E,#, 7→) be a DES. By Lem. 7, σ =
ses(δ) = (E,#,→,⊲) is a SES such that T(δ) = T(σ) and C(δ) = C(σ).
Let t = e1 · · · en ∈ T(δ), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and the bundles X1 7→ ei, . . . , Xm 7→ ei
all bundles pointing to ei. For U to be a cause for ei Def. 13 in [1] requires
(ic(ei) \ dc(U, ei)) ⊆ U . Since dc(H, e) = {e
′ | ∃d ∈ H . [e′→e]⊲d} and ic(e) =
{e′ | e′→ e}, this condition holds iff the condition e′→ ei =⇒ e′ ∈ U ∨ ∃d ∈
U . [e′→ei]⊲d holds for all e′ ∈ E. By Def. 22, then (∀1 ≤ k ≤ n . Xk ∩ U 6= ∅)
iff ((ic(ei) \ dc(U, ei)) ⊆ U). So, by Defs. 8 and 13 in [1], δ≃pσ.
Thus SESs and DESs have the same expressive power.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 1 in [1]). By Ths. 11 and 12.
[3] proves that for DESs equivalence w.r.t. posets based on early causality
coincides with trace equivalence. Since SESs are as expressive as DESs w.r.t.
families of posets based on early causality, the same correspondence holds for
SESs.
Corollary 1. Let σ1, σ2 be two SES. Then σ1≃pσ2 iff T(σ1) = T(σ2).
Then Theorem 2 in [1] states:
Let σ, σ′ be two SES.
Then σ≃pσ
′ iff σ≃tσ
′ iff T(σ) = T(σ′).
Proof (Proof of Theorem 2 in [1]). By Cor. 1, σ≃pσ′ iff T(σ) = T(σ′).
If C(σ) 6= C(σ′) then, by Lem. 3 and Defs. 13 in [1], σ 6≃p σ′ and σ 6≃t σ′.
Hence assume C(σ) = C(σ′). Note that, by Def. 13 and Lem. 3, for all C ∈ C(σ)
there is a trace t ∈ T(σ) such that t = C. Moreover for every trace t ∈ T(σ)
except the empty trace there is a sub-trace t′ ∈ T(σ) and a sequence of events
e1 · · · em such that t = t′e1 · · · em and ∀e ∈ {e1, . . . , em} .
(
ic(e) \ dc
(
t′, e
))
⊆ t′.
Thus, by Lem. 4, T(σ) = T(σ′) iff σ≃tσ′.
Theorem 3 in [1] states:
SESs and EBESs are incomparable.
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Proof (Proof of Theorem 3 in [1]).
Let σξ = ({a, b, c} , ∅, {a→b} , {[a→b]⊲c}) be the SES that is depicted in Fig. 1.
Assume there is some EBES ξ = (E, , 7→) such that T(σξ) = T(ξ). By Def. 13
in [1], T(σξ) = {ǫ, a, c, ab, ac, ca, cb, abc, acb, cab, cba}, i.e. b cannot occur first. By
Def. 6 in [1], a disabling x y implies that y can never precedes x. Thus we have
 ∩{a, b, c}2 = ∅, because within T(σξ) each pair of events of {a, b, c} occur in
any order. Similarly we have 7→ ∩{X 7→e | e ∈ {a, b, c} ∧X ∩ {a, b, c} = ∅} = ∅,
because x 7→ y implies that x always has to precede y. Moreover, by Def. 6,
adding impossible events as causes or using them within the disabling relation
does not influence the set of traces. Thus there is no EBES ξ with the same
traces as σξ. By Def. 6 and the definition of posets in EBESs, then there is no
EBES ξ with the same configurations or posets as σξ.
Let ξσ = ({e, f} , {e f} , ∅) be the EBES that is depicted in Fig. 1. Assume
there is some SES σ = (E,#,→,⊲) such that T(ξσ) = T(σ). According to
§ 2.2 in [1], T(ξσ) = {ǫ, e, f, ef}. By Def. 13 and because of the traces e and f ,
there are no initial causes for e and f, i.e.→ ∩{x→y | y ∈ {e, f}} = ∅. Moreover,
#∩{e, f}2 = ∅, because of the trace ef and because conflicts cannot be dropped.
Thus fe ∈ T(σ) but fe /∈ T(ξσ), i.e. there is no SES σ with the same traces as
ξσ. Then by Def. 13, there is no SES σ with the same configurations or families
of posets as ξσ.
Lemma 8. For each SES σ there is a RCES ρ, such that σ≃t ρ.
Proof. By Def. 13 in [1], X→sY implies X ⊆ Y for all X,Y ∈ C(σ).
Assume X ⊆ X ′ ⊆ Y ′ ⊆ Y . Then, by Def. 13, X →s Y implies ∀e, e
′ ∈
Y . ¬ (e#e′) and ∀e ∈ Y \ X . (ic(e) \ dc(X, e)) ⊆ X . Then X ⊆ X ′ implies
(ic(e) \ dc(X ′, e)) ⊆ (ic(e) \ dc(X, e)). Then ∀e, e′ ∈ Y ′ . ¬ (e#e′) and ∀e ∈
Y ′ \X ′ . (ic(e) \ dc(X ′, e)) ⊆ X ′, because of Y ′ ⊆ Y . By Def. 13, then X ′→sY ′.
Thus σ satisfies the conditions of Def. 20. Then by Lem. 2, ρ = rces(σ) is a
RCES such that σ≃t ρ.
Lemma 9. There is no transition-equivalent SES to the RCES ρσ, where ρσ =
({e, f} , {∅ ⊢ {e} , ∅ ⊢ {f} , {f} ⊢ {e, f}}).
Proof. Assume a SES σ = (E,#,→,⊲) such that σ≃t ρσ. Then C(σ) = C(ρσ).
By Def. 13 in [1] and Lem. 3 and because of the configuration {e, f} ∈ C(ρσ),
the events e and f cannot be in conflict with each other, i.e. # ∩ {e, f}2 = ∅.
Moreover, because of the configurations {e} , {f} ∈ C(ρσ), there are no ini-
tial causes for e and f , i.e. → ∩{x→y | y ∈ {e, f}} = ∅. Note that the re-
lation ⊲ cannot disable events. Thus we have ∀a, b ∈ {e, f} . ¬ (a#b) and
(ic(e) \ dc({f} , e)) = ∅ ⊆ {f}. But then, by Def. 13, {f} →s {e, f}. Since
{f}→rc {e, f} does not hold, this violates our assumption, i.e. there is no SES
which is transition equivalent to ρσ.
Theorem 4 in [1] states:
SESs are strictly less expressive than RCESs.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 4 in [1]). By Lems. 9 and 8.
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3 Alternative Partial Order Semantics in DES and SES
To show that DES and SES are not only behavioral equivalent ES models but
are also very closely related at the structural level we consider the remaining
four intentional partial order semantics for DES of [3].
Liberal causality is the least restrictive notion of causality in [3]. Here each set
of events from bundles pointing to an event e that satisfies all bundles pointing
to e is a cause.
Definition 23 (Liberal Causality). Let δ = (E,#, 7→) be a DES, e1 · · · en
one of its traces, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and X1 7→ei, . . . , Xm 7→ei all bundles pointing to ei.
A set U is a cause of ei in e1 · · · en if
– ∀e ∈ U . ∃1 ≤ j < i . e = ej,
– U ⊆ (X1 ∪ . . . ∪Xm), and
– ∀1 ≤ k ≤ m. Xk ∩ U 6= ∅.
Let Plib(t) be the set of posets obtained this way for a trace t.
Bundle satisfaction causality is based on the idea that for an event e in a
trace each bundle pointing to e is satisfies by exactly one event in a cause of e.
Definition 24 (Bundle Satisfaction Causality). Let δ = (E,#, 7→) be a
DES, e1 · · · en one of its traces, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and X1 7→ei, . . . , Xm 7→ei all bundles
pointing to ei. A set U is a cause of ei in e1 · · · en if
– ∀e ∈ U . ∃1 ≤ j < i . e = ej and
– there is a surjective mapping f : {Xk} → U such that f(Xk) ∈ Xk for all
1 ≤ k ≤ m.
Let Pbsat(t) be the set of posets obtained this way for a trace t.
Minimal causality requires that there is no subset which is also a cause.
Definition 25 (Minimal Causality). Let δ = (E,#, 7→) be a DES and let
e1 · · · en be one of its traces, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and X1 7→ ei, . . . , Xm 7→ ei all bundles
pointing to ei. A set U is a cause of ei in e1 · · · en if
– ∀e ∈ U . ∃1 ≤ j < i . e = ej,
– ∀1 ≤ k ≤ m. Xk ∩ U 6= ∅, and
– there is no proper subset of U satisfying the previous two conditions.
Let Pmin(t) be the set of posets obtained this way for a trace t.
Late causality contains the latest causes of an event that form a minimal set.
Definition 26 (Late Causality). Let δ = (E,#, 7→) be a DES, e1 · · · en one
of its traces, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and X1 7→ ei, . . . , Xm 7→ ei all bundles pointing to ei. A
set U is a cause of ei in e1 · · · en if
– ∀e ∈ U . ∃1 ≤ j < i . e = ej,
– ∀1 ≤ k ≤ m. Xk ∩ U 6= ∅,
– there is no proper subset of U satisfying the previous two conditions, and
– U is the latest set satisfying the previous three conditions.
Let Plate(t) be the set of posets obtained this way for a trace t.
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As derived in [3], it holds that
Plate(t) ,Pd(t) ⊆ Pmin(t) ⊆ Pbsat(t) ⊆ Plib(t)
for all traces t. Moreover a behavioral partial order semantics is defined and it
is shown that two DESs have the same posets w.r.t. to the behavioral partial
order semantics iff they have the same posets w.r.t. to the early partial order
semantics iff they have the same traces.
Bundle satisfaction causality is—as the name suggests—closely related to the
existence of bundles. In SESs there are no bundles. Of course, as shown by the
translation des(·) in Def. 21, we can transform the initial and dropped causes of
an event into a bundle. And of course if we do so an SES σ and its translation
des(σ) have exactly the same families of posets. But, because bundles are no
native concept of SESs, we cannot directly map the definition of posets w.r.t. to
bundle satisfaction to SESs.
To adapt the definitions of posets in the other three cases we have to replace
the condition U ⊆ (X1 ∪ . . . ∪Xm) by U ⊆ ({e | e→ei ∨ ∃e′ ∈ E . [e′→ei]⊲e})
and replace the condition ∀1 ≤ k ≤ m. Xk ∩ U 6= ∅ by (ic(ei) \ dc(U, ei)) ⊆ U
(as in Def. 13 in [1]). The remaining conditions remain the same with respect
to traces as defined in Def. 13. Let Plib(t), Pmin(t), and Plate(t) denote the
sets of posets obtained this way for a trace t ∈ T(σ) of a SES σ w.r.t. liberal,
minimal, and late causality. Moreover, let Px(δ) =
⋃
t∈T(δ) Px(t) and Px(σ) =⋃
t∈T(σ) Px(t) for all x ∈ {lib, bsat,min, late}.
Since again the definitions of posets in DESs and SESs are very similar the
translations des(·) and ses(·) preserve families of posets. The proof is very similar
to the proofs of Ths. 11 and 12.
Theorem 13. For each SES σ there is a DES δ, namely δ = des(σ), and for
each DES δ there is a SES σ, namely σ = ses(δ), such that Px(σ) = Px(δ) for
all x ∈ {lib,min, late}.
Proof. The definitions of posets in DESs and SESs w.r.t. to minimal and late
causality differ in exactly the same condition and its replacement as the defini-
tions of posets in DESs and SESs w.r.t. early causality. Thus the proof in these
two cases is similar to the proofs of Ths. 11 and 12.
If σ = (E,#,→,⊲) is a SES then, by Lem. 5, δ = des(σ) = (E,#, 7→) is
a DES such that T(σ) = T(δ) and C(σ) = C(δ). If δ = (E,#, 7→) is a DES
then, by Lem. 7, σ = ses(δ) = (E,#,→,⊲) is a DES such that T(δ) = T(σ)
and C(δ) = C(σ). In both cases let t = e1 · · · en ∈ T(σ), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and
X1 7→ei, . . . , Xm 7→ei be all bundles pointing to ei.
In the case of liberal causality, for U to be a cause for ei the definition of
posets in SESs requires U ⊆ ({e | e→ei ∨ ∃e′ ∈ E . [e′→ei]⊲e}) and (ic(ei) \
dc(U, ei)) ⊆ U . The second condition holds iff ∀1 ≤ k ≤ m. Xk∩U 6= ∅ as shown
in the proofs of Ths. 11 and 12. By Defs. 21 and 22, the first conditions holds iff
U ⊆ (X1 ∪ . . . ∪Xm). So, by the definitions of posets in DESs and SESs w.r.t.
to liberal causality, Plib(σ) = Plib(δ).
Dynamic Causality in Event Structures (Technical Report) 9
4 Growing Causality
As in SESs, both notions of configurations of GESs, traced-based and transition-
based; coincide and in different situations, the more suitable one can be used.
Lemma 10. Let γ be a GES. Then CTr(γ) = C(γ).
Proof. Let γ = (E,#,→,◮).
By Def. 15 in [1], C ∈ CTr(γ) implies that there is some t = e1 · · · en such
that t ⊆ E, ∀1 ≤ i, j ≤ n . ¬ (ei#ej), ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n .
(
ic(ei) ∪ ac
(
ti−1, ei
))
⊆ ti−1,
and C = t. Hence, by Def. 15, ti→g ti+1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and ∅→g {e1}. Thus,
by Def. 15, C ∈ C(γ).
By Def. 15, C ∈ C(γ) implies that there are X1, . . . , Xn ⊆ E such that
∅→gX1→g . . .→gXn and Xn = C. Then, by Def. 15, we have:
∅ ⊆ X1 ⊆ X2 ⊆ . . . ⊆ Xn ⊆ E (D1)
∀e, e′ ∈ Xn . ¬ (e#e
′) (D2)
∀e ∈ X1 . (ic(e) ∪ ac(∅, e)) ⊆ ∅ (D3)
∀1 ≤ i < n . ∀e ∈ Xi+1 \Xi .
(ic(e) ∪ ac(Xi, e)) ⊆ Xi
(D4)
∀1 ≤ i < n . ∀t,m ∈ Xi+1 \Xi . ∀c ∈ E .
m◮ [c→ t] =⇒ c ∈ Xi
(D5)
Let X1 = {e1,1, . . . , e1,m1} and Xi \ Xi−1 = {ei,1, . . . , ei,mi} for all 1 < i ≤ n.
Then, by Def. 15, t = e1,1 · · · e1,m1 · · · en,1 · · · en,mn = e
′
1 · · · e
′
k is a trace such that
t ⊆ E (because of (D1)), ¬
(
e′i#e
′
j
)
for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k (because of (D1) and
(D2)), for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k and all 1 ≤ j ≤ mi we have
(
ic(ei,j) ∪ ac
(
ti−1, ei,j
))
⊆
ti−1 (because of (D3), (D4), and, by (D5), ac
(
ti−1 ∪Xi, ei,j
)
= ac
(
ti−1, ei,j
)
),
and t = C (because Xn = C). Thus C ∈ CTr(γ).
For the incomparability result between GESs and EBESs we consider two
counterexamples, and show that there is no equivalent EBES or GES respec-
tively.
Lemma 11. There is no configuration-equivalent GES to βγ (cf. Fig. 1).
Proof. Assume a GES γ = (E,#′,→,◮) such that C(γ) = C(βγ). According to
§ 2.2 in [1], C(βγ) = {∅, {a} , {b} , {a, c} , {b, c}}. Because {c} /∈ C(βγ), {a, c} ∈
C(βγ), and by Def. 15 in [1] and Lem. 10, a has to be an initial cause of c in γ, i.e.
a→c. But then, by Def. 15 and Lem. 10, {b, c} /∈ C(γ) although {b, c} ∈ C(βγ).
This violates our assumption, i.e. no GES can be configuration equivalent to βγ .
Lemma 12. There is no trace-equivalent EBES to γξ (cf. Fig. 1).
Proof. Assume a EBES ξ = (E,#, 7→) such that T(ξ) = T(γξ). By Def. 15 in
[1], a, c, ca, bac ∈ T(γξ) and ac /∈ T(γξ). Because of a, c ∈ T(γξ) and by Def. 6 in
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[1], a and c have to be initially enabled in ξ, i.e. 7→ ∩ {X 7→y | y ∈ {a, c}} = ∅.
Moreover, because of ca, bac ∈ T(γξ), a cannot disable c, i.e. ¬ (a c). But then
ac ∈ T(ξ). This violates our assumption, i.e. there is no trace-equivalent EBES
to γξ.
Theorem 5 in [1] states:
GESs are incomparable to BESs and EBESs.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 5 in [1]). By Lem. 11, there is no GES that is con-
figuration equivalent to the BES βγ . Thus no GES can have the same families
of posets as the BES βγ , because two BES with different configurations cannot
have the same families of posets (cf. § 2.2 in [1]). Moreover, by Defs. 3 and 5
in [1], each BES is also an EBES. Thus no GES can have the same families of
posets as the EBES βγ .
By Lem. 12, there is no EBES and thus also no BES that is trace-equivalent
to the GES γξ. By Def. 15 in [1], two GES with different traces cannot have the
same transition graphs. Thus no EBES or BES can be transition-equivalent to
γξ.
For the incomparability between GESs and SESs, we study a GES counterex-
ample, such that no SES is trace-equivalent.
Lemma 13. There is no trace-equivalent SES to γσ (cf. Fig. 1).
Proof. Assume a SES σ = (E,#,→,⊲) such that T(σ) = T(γσ). By Def. 15
in [1], T(γσ) = {ǫ, a, b, ab}. Because of the trace ab ∈ T(γσ) and by Def.
13 in [1], a and b cannot be in conflict, i.e. ¬(a#b) and ¬(b#a). Moreover,
because of the traces a, b ∈ T(γσ), there are no initial cases for a or b, i.e.
→ ∩{x→y | y ∈ {a, b}} = ∅. Thus, by Def. 13, ba ∈ T(σ) but ba /∈ T(γσ). This
violates our assumption, i.e. no SES can be trace equivalent to γσ.
Theorem 6 in [1] states:
GESs and SESs are incomparable.
Proof (Theorem 6 in [1]). By Lem. 13, no SES is trace-equivalent to the GES γσ.
By Def. 15 in [1], two GES with different traces cannot have the same transition
graphs. Thus no SES is transition-equivalent to the GES γσ.
By [2], BESs are less expressive than EBESs and by [3], BESs are less expres-
sive than DESs. By Th. 5 in [1], BESs and GESs are incomparable an by Th. 1
in [1] DESs are as expressive as SESs. Thus GESs and SESs are incomparable.
To show that GESs are strictly less expressive than RCESs, we give a translation
for one direction and a counterexample for the other.
Lemma 14. For each GES γ there is an RCES ρ, such that γ≃t ρ.
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Proof. Let γ = (E,#,→,◮). By Def. 15 in [1], X→g Y implies X ⊆ Y .
Assume X ⊆ X ′ ⊆ Y ′ ⊆ Y and X→g Y . By Def. 15, then we have ∀e, e′ ∈
Y ′ . ¬ (e#e′), ∀e ∈ (Y ′ \X ′) . (ic(e) ∪ ac(X, e)) ⊆ X , and ∀t,m ∈ Y \X . ∀c ∈
E . m◮ [c → t] =⇒ c ∈ X . Moreover, because ∀t,m ∈ Y \ X . ∀c ∈ E . m◮
[c → t] =⇒ c ∈ X , ac(X, e) = ac(X ′, e) for all e ∈ Y ′ \ X ′. Hence ∀e ∈
(Y ′ \X ′) . (ic(e) ∪ ac(X ′, e)) ⊆ X ′ and ∀t,m ∈ Y ′ \ X ′ . ∀c ∈ E . m ◮ [c →
t] =⇒ c ∈ X ′. Thus, by Def. 15, X ′→g Y ′.
By Lem. 2, ρ = rces(γ) is an RCES and γ≃tρ.
Lemma 15. There is no transition-equivalent GES to ργ (cf. Fig. 3 in [1]).
Proof. Assume a GES γ = (E,#,→,◮) such that γ≃t ργ . Then C(γ) = C(ργ).
By Def. 15 in [1] and because of the configuration {a, b, c} ∈ C(ργ), the events a,
b, and c cannot be in conflict with each other, i.e. #∩{a, b, c}2 = ∅. Moreover, be-
cause of the configurations {a} , {b} , {c} ∈ C(ργ), there are no initial causes for a,
b, or c, i.e. → ∩{x→y | y ∈ {a, b, c}} = ∅. Finally, because of the configurations
{a, c} , {b, c} ∈ C(ργ), neither a nor b can add a cause (except of themselves) to
c, i.e. a◮ [e → c] =⇒ e = a and b◮ [e → c] =⇒ e = b for all e ∈ E. Thus
we have ∀e, e′ ∈ {a, b, c} . ¬ (e#e′) and (ic(c) ∪ ac({a, b} , c)) = ∅ ⊆ {a, b}. But
then, by Def. 15, {a, b}→g {a, b, c}. Since ¬ ({a, b}→rc {a, b, c}), this violates our
assumption, i.e. there is no GES that is transition equivalent to ργ .
Theorem 7 in [1] states:
GESs are strictly less expressive than RCESs.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 7 in [1]). By Lems. 14 and 15.
5 Dynamic Causality
In order to justify our approach of state transition equivalence, we need a notion
of (configuration) transition equivalence, and show that the new equivalence is
needed.
Definition 27. Let ∆ be a DCES. The set of its (reachable) configurations is
C(∆) = π1(S(∆)); the projection on the first component of the states.
Lemma 1 in [1] states:
There are DCESs that are transition equivalent but not state transition
equivalent.
Proof (Proof of Lemma 1 in [1]). We consider two DCESs ∆ = ({a, b, c, d} , ∅, ∅,
{[c→d]⊲b} , {a◮ [c→ d]}) and ∆′ = ({a, b, c, d} , ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅). In ∆ there is a tran-
sition (∅, csi)→d ({a} , cs′) by Def. 18 in [1]. Initially the causality function is
the constant empty set function (cf. definition of csi) in Def. 17 in [1]). After
a occurs cs′(d) = {c} is updated according to Def. 18 Condition 6. Next we
have ({a} , cs′)→d ({a, b} , cs′′), where cs′′(d) = ∅ according to Condition 4. Now
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there is a possible transition to ({a, b, d} , cs′′′). But if we proceed from (∅, csi) to
({b} , cs′) with cs′(d) = ∅ according to Condition 4 and then to ({a, b} , cs′′) with
cs′′(d) = {c} according to Condition 6 there is no transition to ({a, b, d}, cs′′′),
because c needs d according to Condition 3. In ∆′ both sequences of state transi-
tions are possible by Def. 18. Thus ∆ and ∆′ are not state transition equivalent.
On the other hand, if we only consider the configurations of ∆ and ∆′ saying
there is a transition from C to C′ whenever (C, cs)→d (C′, cs′), then ∆ and ∆′
are transition equivalent.
To compare DCESs to other ESs we define the Single State Dynamic Causal-
ity ESs (SSDCs) as a subclass of DCESs.
Definition 28. Let SSDC be a subclass of DCESs such that ̺ is a SSDC iff
∀e, e′ ∈ E . ∄a, d ∈ E . a◮ [e′ → e]⊲d.
Since there are no adders and droppers for the same causal dependency, the order
of modifiers does not matter and thus there are no two different states sharing the
same configuration, i.e. each configuration represents a state. Thus it is enough
for SSDC to consider transition equivalence with respect to configurations, i.e.
≃t.
Lemma 16. Let ̺ be a SSDC. Then for the causal-state function cs of any state
(C, cs) ∈ S(̺) it holds cs(e) = (ic(e) ∪ ac(C, e)) \ (dc(C, e) ∪C).
Proof. If C = ∅ the equation follows directly from the definitions of cs, ic, ac,
and dc.
Assume (C, cs)→d (C′, cs′). By induction, we have cs(e) = (ic(e)∪ac(C, e))\
(dc(C, e) ∪ C). We prove for each e ∈ E \ C′ by a doubled case distinction
cs′(e) = (ic(e) ∪ ac(C′, e)) \ (dc(C′, e) ∪ C). Let us first assume e′ /∈ cs(e) but
e′ ∈ cs′(e), then by Condition 6 in [1] we have ∃a ∈ C′ \ C . a◮ [e′ → e] and
since ac(C′, e) = {e′ | ∃a ∈ C′ . a◮ [e′ → e] ∧ a /∈ {e, e′}} we have e′ ∈ ac(C′, e),
because ̺ is a SSDC it follows e′ /∈ dc(C′, e) and because e ∈ E \ C′ it follows
e /∈ C. Then in this case e′ ∈ (ic(e) ∪ ac(C′, e)) \ (dc(C′, e) ∪ C) holds. Let now
still e′ /∈ cs(e) but e′ /∈ cs′(e), then we have by contra-position of Condition 7 we
have ∄a ∈ C′ \C . a◮ [e′ → e], and so e′ /∈ (ic(e)∪ac(C′, e))\ (dc(C′, e)∪C). Let
us now consider the case e′ ∈ cs(e) and here first e′ ∈ cs′(e). Then by Condition 5
it follows ∄d ∈ C′ \C . [e′→e]⊲d. Then e′ /∈ dc(C′, e) and because e ∈ E \C′ it
follows e /∈ C and so e′ /∈ (ic(e) ∪ ac(C′, e)) \ (dc(C′, e)∪C). In the last case we
consider e′ ∈ cs(e) and e′ /∈ cs′(e). By Condition 4 we have ∃d ∈ C′\C . [e′→e]⊲
d and so e′ ∈ dc(C′, e). Thus e′ /∈ (ic(e) ∪ ac(C′, e)) \ (dc(C′, e) ∪C). So in each
case cs′(e) = (ic(e) ∪ ac(C′, e)) \ (dc(C′, e) ∪C) holds.
In SSDC Conditions 4, 5, 6, and 7 in [1] hold whenever C ⊆ C′.
Lemma 17. Let ρ be a SSDC and let (C, cs) and (C′, cs′) be two states of ρ with
C ⊆ C′, then Conditions 4, 5, 6, and 7 in [1] of →d hold for those two states.
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Proof. Let e′ ∈ E \ C′ with e′ ∈ cs(e) \ cs′(e).
Since ac(C, e) = {e′ | ∃a ∈ C . a◮ [e′ → e] ∧ a /∈ {e, e′}}, dc(C, e) = {e′ | ∃d ∈
C . [e′→e] ⊲ d} and C ⊆ C′, we have ac(C, e) ⊆ ac(C′, e) and dc(C, e) ⊆
dc(C′, e) and by the previous Lem. 16 we have e′ ∈ ((ic(e)∪ac(C, e))\(dc(C, e)∪
C))\((ic(e)∪ac(C′, e))\(dc(C′, e)∪C′)), so e′ ∈ ((ic(e)∪ac(C, e))\(dc(C, e)∪C))
and e′ /∈ ((ic(e) ∪ ac(C′, e)) \ (dc(C′, e) ∪ C′)). Then e′ ∈ ic(e) ∪ ac(C, e) and
so e′ ∈ ic(e) ∪ ac(C′, e), thus e′ ∈ (dc(C′, e) ∪ C′) and so e′ ∈ dc(C′, e), but
e′ /∈ dc(C, e), which yields [e′ → e]⊲ ∩(C′ \ C) 6= ∅, so Condition 4 in [1] holds.
Let now e, e′ ∈ E \ C′ with [e′ → e] ⊲ ∩(C′ \ C) 6= ∅, then e′ ∈ dc(C′, e) so
e′ /∈ cs′(e) follows, which is exactly 5.
Conditions 6 and 7 are proven similarly.
Lemma 18. Let ρ be a SSDC and (X, csX)→d (Y, csY ) a transition in ρ. Then
for all X ′, Y ′ with X ⊆ X ′ ⊆ Y ′ ⊆ Y , there is a transition (X ′, cs′X)→d (Y
′, cs′Y )
in ρ, where csX′(e) = ((ic(e)∪ac(X ′, e))\(dc(X ′, e)∪X ′)) and csY ′(e) = ((ic(e)∪
ac(Y ′, e)) \ (dc(Y ′, e) ∪ Y ′)).
Proof. By assumption Conditions 1 and 2 of Def. 18 in [1] of the transition
relation holds for the two states (X ′, csX′) and (Y
′, csY ′). Conditions 4, 5, 6, and
7 follow from Lem. 17. Condition 8 holds because of Def. 28 and ρ is a SSDC.
Condition 9 holds because it is a special case of the same conditions for (X, csX)
and (Y, csY ). Let now e ∈ Y ′\X ′, such that cs(e)X′ 6= ∅, then there is a ∈ X
′\X
and a c ∈ E with a◮ [c → e], but this is a contradiction with Condition 9 of
(X, csX)→d (Y, csY ), so Condition 3 holds. Thus (X ′, cs′X)→d (Y
′, cs′Y ) holds.
Definition 29. Let σ = (E,#,→,⊲) be a SES. Then its embedding is i(σ) =
(E,#,→,⊲, ∅). Similarly let γ = (E,#,→,◮) be a GES. Then its embedding is
i(γ) = (E,#,→, ∅,◮).
For each embedding the causal state coincides with a condition on the initial,
added, and dropped causes, that are enforced in the transition relations of SESs
and GESs.
Lemma 19. Let σ be a SES and i(σ) its embedding. Then we have for each
state (C, cs) of i(σ), cs(e) = ic(e) \ (dc(C, e) ∪ C).
Proof. By Lem. 16 and because ac(C, e) = ∅ in i(σ) for all configurations C and
events e.
Lemma 20. Let γ be a GES and i(γ) its embedding. Then we have for each
state (C, cs) of i(γ), cs(e) = (ic(e) ∪ ac(C, e)) \ C.
Proof. By Lem. 16 and because dc(C, e) = ∅ in i(γ) for all configurations C and
events e.
SESs (resp. GESs) and their embeddings are transition equivalent.
Lemma 21. Let µ be a GES or SES, then we have i(µ)≃tµ.
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Proof. Let µ be a SES and C→sC
′ a transition in µ, we define for a configuration
C a causality state function cs : E \X → P(E \X) as cs(e) = ic(e)\ (dc(X,E)∪
X). C′ is conflict free and C ⊆ C′, because C →s C′ and Def. 13 in [1], so
Conditions 1 and 2 of Def. 18 in [1] are satisfied. Moreover in the configuration
C we have cs(e) = ic(e) \ (dc(C,E) ∪C), so Conditions 3, 4, and 5 are fulfilled.
Conditions 6, 8, 7, and 9 are trivially satisfied, because ◮ = ∅, so (C, cs)→d
(C′, cs′). Let now (C, cs)→d (C′, cs′) in i(µ), then by Defs. 18, 13 in combination
with Lem. 19 there is a transition C→sC′ in µ.
Let now µ be a GES and C→gC′ a transition in µ, we define for a configuration
X a causality state function cs : E \X → P(E \X) as cs(e) = (ic(e)∪ac(X, e))\
X . C′ is conflict free and C ⊆ C′, because C →s C′ and Def. 15 in [1], so
Conditions 2, 1, and 9 of Def. 18 are satisfied. Moreover in the configuration C
we have cs(e) = (ic(e) ∪ ac(C, e)) \ C, so Conditions 3, 6, and 7 are fulfilled.
Conditions 4, 5, and 8 are trivially satisfied, because ⊲ = ∅. Let now (C, cs)→d
(C′, cs′) in i(µ), then by Defs. 18, 15 in combination with Lem. 20 there is a
transition C→gC′ in µ.
For the incomparability result between DCESs and SESs, we give an RCES
counterexample, which cannot be modeled by a DCES.
Lemma 22. There is no transition-equivalent DCES to ργ (cf. Fig. 1).
Proof (Proof of Lemma 22). Assume ∆ = (E,#,→,⊲,◮) such that ∆ ≃t ργ .
Then C(∆) = C(ργ). By Def. 18 in [1] and because of the configuration {a, b, c} ∈
C(ργ), the events a, b, and c cannot be in conflict with each other, i.e. # ∩
{a, b, c}2 = ∅. Moreover, because of the configurations {a} , {b} , {c} ∈ C(ργ),
there are no initial causes for a, b, or c, i.e. → ∩{x→y | y ∈ {a, b, c}} = ∅. Note
that the relation ⊲ cannot disable events. Finally, because of the configurations
{a, c} , {b, c} ∈ C(ργ), neither a nor b can add a cause (except of themselves)
to c, i.e. a ◮ [e → c] =⇒ e = a and b ◮ [e → c] =⇒ e = b for all e ∈ E.
Thus we have ∀e, e′ ∈ {a, b, c} . ¬ (e#e′) and in the state ({a, b} , cs) it follows
cs(c) = ∅ ⊆ {a, b}. But then, by Def. 18, ({a, b} , cs)→d ({a, b, c} , cs
′) for some
causal state functions cs and cs′. Since ¬ ({a, b}→rc {a, b, c}), this violates our
assumption, i.e. there is no DCES that is transition equivalent to ργ .
Theorem 8 in [1] states:
DCESs and RCESs are incomparable.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 8 in [1]). It follows from Lems. 22 and 1 in [1], and
because ∆≃s∆′ (for ∆ and ∆′ as in the proof of Lem. 1), then no two RCESs
ρ and ρ′, with ρ 6≃t ρ
′ can distinguish between ∆ and ∆′.
Theorem 9 in [1] states:
DCESs are strictly more expressive than GESs and SESs.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 9 in [1]). By Ths. 8, 7, and 4 in [1] and Lem. 21.
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6 Comparing DCESs with EBESs
To compare with EBESs, we define a sub-class of DCESs, where posets could be
defined and used for semantics.
Definition 30. Let EBDC denotes a subclass of SSDC with the additional re-
quirements: 1. ∀c,m, t ∈ E . m ◮ [c → t] =⇒ c = t 2. ∀c,m1, . . . ,mn, t ∈
E . [c→t]⊲m1, . . . ,mn =⇒ ∀e1, e2 ∈ {c,m1, . . . ,mn} . (e1 6= e2 =⇒ e1#e2)
The first condition translates disabling into ◮ and ensures that disabled
events cannot be enabled again. The second condition reflects causal unambigu-
ity by ⊲ such that either the initial cause or one of its droppers can happen.
We adapt the notion of precedence.
Definition 31. Let ϑ be a EBDC and C ∈ C(ϑ), then we define the precedence
relation <C⊆ C × C as e <C e′ ⇐⇒ e→ e′ ∨ e′◮ [e→ e] ∨ ∃c ∈ E . [c→e′]⊲e.
Let ≤C be the reflexive and transitive closure of <C.
The relation <C indeed represents a precedence relation, and its reflexive
transitive closure is a partial order.
Lemma 23. Let ϑ be a EBDC, C ∈ C(ϑ), and let e, e′ ∈ C . e <C e′. Let also
(C0, cs0)→d . . .→d (Cn, csn) with C0 = ∅ and Cn = C be the transition sequence
of C, then ∃Ci ∈ {C0, . . . , Cn} . e ∈ Ci ∧ e′ /∈ Ci.
Proof. Let (Cf , csf ) be the first occurrence of e in the sequence (C0, cs0)→d
. . .→d (Cn, csn), so according to Condition 1 of Def. 18 in [1] it is enough to
prove that e′ /∈ Cf . First, assume that e→ e′, then e ∈ cs0(e′) according to the
definition of csi. Then according to Def. 18 the only situation where e /∈ csf−1(e′)
is that there is a dropper e′′ ∈ Cf−1 for it according to Condition 4, but that is
impossible since e and e′ will be in conflict according to Condition 2 of Def. 30.
So e ∈ csf−1(e′) and thus e′ /∈ Cf according to Condition 3 of Def. 18.
Second assume that e′◮ [e→ e]. If e′ ∈ Cf−1 then according to Condition 7
of Def. 18 e ∈ csf−1(e) which means e /∈ Cf according to Condition 3 of Def. 18,
which is a contradiction to the definition of Cf . Then according to Condition 9
of Def. 18, if e′ ∈ Cf , it follows e ∈ Cf−1, which again contradicts the definition
of Cf . So because e
′ ∈ C, there is an h > f , such that e′ ∈ Ch but e′ /∈ Ch−1.
Third, assume ∃c ∈ E . [c→e′]⊲e. Then since EBDC are a subclass of SSDC
we have ∄a ∈ E . a◮ [c → e′] according to Def. 28. Then c → e′ according to
Condition 1 of Def. 16 in [1], which means c ∈ cs0(e
′) according to definition
of csi in Def. 18. Let us assume that e
′ ∈ Cf then either c or another dropper
d . [c→e′] ⊲ d occurred before e′, which is impossible because of the mutual
conflict in Condition 2 of Def. 30. So e′ /∈ Cf .
Lemma 24. ≤C is a partial order over C.
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Proof. Let e, e′ ∈ C . e <C e
′ and let (∅ = C0, cs0) . . . (Cn = C, csn) be the
transition sequence of C. Let also Ch, Cj be the configurations where e, e
′ first
occur, respectively, then according to Lem. 23, h < j. Since ≤C is the reflexive
and transitive closure of <C , then e ≤C e
′ =⇒ h ≤ j. For anti-symmetry, assume
that e′ ≤C e also then according to Lem. 23: j ≤ h, but h ≤ j, then h = j. The
only possibility for h = j is that e = e′ because otherwise h < j and j < h,
which is a contradiction.
Let P(ϑ) = {(C,≤C) | C ∈ C(ϑ)} denotes the set of posets of the EBDC ϑ.
We show that the transitions of a EBDC ϑ can be extracted from its posets.
Theorem 14. Let ϑ be a EBDC and (C, cs), (C′, cs′) ∈ S(ϑ) with C ⊆ C′.
Then (∀e, e′ ∈ C′ . e 6= e′ ∧ e′ ≤C′ e =⇒ e′ ∈ C) holds iff (C, cs)→d (C′ cs′).
Proof. First, because C′ is a configuration it is conflict free. Now let us assume
∀e, e′ ∈ C′ . e 6= e′ ∧ e′ ≤C′ e ⇒ e′ ∈ C, we now show that all the condi-
tions of Def. 18 in [1] hold for (C, cs) and (C′, cs′). Condition 1, C ⊆ C′, holds
by assumption. Conditions 4, 5, 6, and 7 follow immediately from Lem. 17.
Condition 8 follows from Def. 28 of SSDC, since ϑ is an EBDC which is a sub-
class of SSDC. To prove Condition 3, let f ∈ (C′ \ C), then we have from
Lem. 16 cs(f) = (ic(f) ∪ ac(C, f)) \ (dc(C, f) ∪C). Assume cs(f) 6= ∅, i.e.
∃f ′ ∈ cs(f). So either f ′ ∈ ic(f) or f ∈ ∪ ac(C, f). We can ignore the case
that f ′ ∈ ac(C, f), because in EBDC the added causality for f can only be f ,
which would make f impossible, but this cannot be the case since f ∈ C′. So
let us consider the remaining option: f ′ ∈ ic(f). Then f ′ ≤C′ f by the def-
inition of ≤C′ . Then by assumption, f
′ ∈ C and therefore f ′ /∈ cs(f), which
is a contradiction. Then ∀f ∈ (C′ \ C) . cs(f) = ∅. For Condition 9 we show
∀t,m ∈ C′ \ C . ∀c ∈ E . m◮ [c → t] =⇒ c ∈ C. The only growing causality is
of the form m◮ [c → c] and according to Def. 31, m◮ [c → c] means c ≤C′ m,
then c ∈ C.
Let us now assume (C, cs)→d (C′, cs′), and e, e′ ∈ C′ with e 6= e′ and e′ ≤C′ e,
so by Lem. 23 it follows e′ ∈ C.
The following defines a translation from an EBESs into an EBDC, which
is proved in Lem. 25 to be an EBDC. Furthermore this translation preserves
posets. Figure 2 provides an example, where conflicts with impossible events are
dropped for simplicity.
Definition 32. Let ξ = (E, , 7→, l) be an EBES. Then dces(ξ) = (E′,#′,→
,⊲,◮) such that: 1. E′,→,⊲ are defined as in 22 2. #′ = {(e, e′) | e e′∧e′  
e} ∪ {(xi, x) | x ∈ Xi} 3. ◮ = {(e, e′, e) ∈ E3 | e e′ ∧ ¬(e′  e)}.
Lemma 25. Let ξ be an EBES. Then dces(ξ) is an EBDC.
Proof. First dces(ξ) is a DCES. The definition of → in Def. 22 ensures Condi-
tions 16(1) and 16(2) in [1]. According to the definition of ⊲ in Def. 22, the only
dropped causes are the fresh events, which cannot be added by ◮ according to
Def. 32(3). So Condition 16(3) also holds.
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Figure 2. An EBES and its poset-equivalent DCES.
Second, dces(ξ) is a SSDC, since the only dropped events are the fresh ones
which are never added by ◮, so Def. 28 holds.
Third, dces(ξ) is a EBDC. Def. 30(1) holds by definition. Bundle members
in ξ mutually disable each other, then according to the definition of #′ Condi-
tion 30(2) holds. Therefore dces(ξ) is a EBDC.
Before comparing an EBES with its translation according to posets, we make
use of the following lemma.
Lemma 26. Let ξ = (E, , 7→) be an EBES. Then C(ξ) = C(dces(ξ)).
Proof. First, ∀c ⊆ E . c ∈ C(ξ) =⇒ c ∈ C(dces(ξ)). According to § 2.2 in [1],
c ∈ C(ξ) means there is a trace t = e1, . . . , en in ξ such that c = t¯. Let us prove
that t corresponds to a transition sequence in dces(ξ) leading to c. i.e. let us
prove that there exists a transition sequence (∅ = c0, cs0)→d . . .→d (cn = c, csn)
such that ci = ci−1 ∪{ei} for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and csi is defined according to Lem. 16.
This means we have to prove that (ci−1, csi−1)→d (ci, csi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
ci is conflict-free since it is a configuration in ξ which means that it does not
contain any mutual disabling according to trace definition in § 2.2. Second, it is
clear that ci−1 ⊆ ci by definition. Next, let us prove that ∀e ∈ ci\ci−1 . csi−1 = ∅,
i.e. (ic(e) ∪ ac(ci−1, e))) \ dc(ci−1, e) ⊆ ci−1 according to Lem. 16. ic(e) contains
only fresh events according to the definition of dces(ξ), and the members of bun-
dles Xi 7→ e are droppers of these fresh events. But since each of these bundles is
satisfied, then each of these fresh events in ic(e) is dropped. Furthermore, there
cannot be added causality in dces(ξ) for e except for e itself which makes it an
impossible event, but it is not an impossible event since it occurs in a configu-
ration. Therefore (ic(e) ∪ ac(ci−1, e)) \ (dc(ci−1, e) ∪ ci−1) = ∅ for all e ∈ ci and
all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. On the other hand, conditions 4, 5, 6, and 7 of Def. 18 in [1]
hold according to Lem. 17. Condition 8 of Def. 18 holds by Def. 28. Since in
the transition (ci−1, csi−1)→d (ci, csi), only one event –namely ei– occurs, then
Def. 18(9) also holds.
In that way we proved that C(ξ) ⊆ C(dces(ξ)). In a similar way, and with
the help of Lem. 18, we can prove that C(dces(ξ)) ⊆ C(ξ) which means that
C(ξ) = C(dces(ξ)).
Lemma 27. For each EBES ξ there is a DCES, namely dces(ξ), such that
P(ξ) = P(dces(ξ)).
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Proof. First, ∀p ∈ P(ξ) .p ∈ P(dces(ξ)). Let p = (C,≤C), then C ∈ C(ξ) by the
definition of posets of EBESs. Then according to Th. 26: C ∈ C(dces(ξ)). On the
other hand, let ≤′C be the partial order defined for C in dces(ξ) as in Def. 31. This
means that we should prove that ≤C=≤
′
C . But since ≤C ,≤
′
C are the reflexive
and transitive closures of ≺C , <C respectively, then it is enough to prove that
≺C=<C . In other words we have to prove ∀e, e′ ∈ C . e ≺C e′ ⇔ e′ <C e.
Let us start with e ≺C e
′ =⇒ e <C e
′. According to § 2.2 in [1] e ≺C e
′ means
∃X ⊆ E . e ∈ X 7→ e′∨e e′. If ∃X ⊆ E . e ∈ X 7→ e′ then ∃c ∈ E′ . [c→e′]⊲e
by the definition of dces(ξ) Def. 32. This means e <C according to the definition
of <C Def. 31. If e  e
′ then ¬e′  e since otherwise e, e′ are in conflict. This
means e′ ◮ [e → e] according to Def. 32, which means e <C e′ according to
Def. 31.
Let us consider the other direction: e <C e
′ =⇒ e ≺C e
′. e <C e
′ means
∃c ∈ E′ . [c→e′]⊲ e ∨ e′◮ [e → e] according to the definition of <C in Def. 31.
The third option where e → e′ is rejected since the only initial causes that
exist in dces(ξ) are the fresh impossible events. If ∃c ∈ E′ . [c→e′] ⊲ e then
∃X ⊆ E . e ∈ X  e′ according to the definition of ⊲ in dces(ξ). This means
e ≺C e′ by the definition of ≺C in § 2.2. If on the other hand e′◮ [e → e] then
e e′ according to the definition of dces(ξ), which means e ≺C in § 2.2.
In that way we have proved that ≺C=<C , which means that ≤C=≤C . In a
similar way we can prove that ∀p ∈ P(dces(ξ)) .p ∈ P(ξ), which means P(ξ) =
P(dces(ξ)).
Lemma 28. There is a DCES such no EBES with the same configurations exits.
Proof. We consider the embedding i(σξ) (cf. Fig. 1) of the SES σξ, which models
disjunctive causality. According to Def. 13, because ¬(a#c) and ic(a) = ic(c) =
∅, it holds ∅ →s {a, c} and so {a, c} ∈ C(σξ). Further there is no transition
∅ →s {b}, because ic(b) = {a}, but there are transitions {a} →s {a, b} and
{c}→s {c, b}, because ic(b) \dc({a}, b) ⊆ {a} (ic(b) \dc({c}, b) ⊆ {c} resp.). The
transitions are translated to the embedding according to Lem. 21 and Def. 27
the same holds for the configurations.
If we now assume there is a EBES ξ with the configurations ∅, {a}, {c}, {a, c},
{a, b}, {b, c} and {a, b, c} then according to Def. 5 in [1] because there is no
configuration {b} there must be a non-empty bundle X 7→ b and caused by the
the configurations {a, b}, {b, c} this bundle X must contain a and c. Now the
stability condition of Def. 5 implies ac and ca , so a and c are in mutual
conflict contradicting to the assumption {a, c} ∈ C(ξ). Thus there is no EBES
with the same configurations as i(σξ) .
Theorem 10 in [1] states:
DCESs are strictly more expressive than EBESs.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 10 in [1]). Follows directly from Lems. 28 and 27.
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